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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Saenz appeals, contending the prosecutor committed misconduct amounting to
fundamental error in his rebuttal closing arguments by arguing facts not in evidence and by
misrepresenting facts by taking them out of context. The State's response to the first prong of
the fundamental error analysis issue relied on a strawman argument and an oversimplification of
the applicable legal standard. It used that same strawman to argue the second prong, and its
conclusory argument on the third prong runs contrary to the applicable legal standards. As such,
this Court should reject the State's arguments and vacate Mr. Saenz's conviction due to the
prosecutor's attempt to secure that conviction on improper bases.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated m
Mr. Saenz's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated m this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct amounting to fundamental error by arguing in his
rebuttal closing that the jury should reject Mr. Saenz's theory of the case based on
misrepresentations of facts and on facts that were not admitted as evidence.

2

ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Amounting To Fundamental Error By Arguing In His
Rebuttal Closing That The Jury Should Reject Mr. Saenz's Theory Of The Case Based On
Misrepresentations Of The Facts And On Facts That Were Not Admitted As Evidence

A.

The State's Arguments On The First Prong Of Perry1 Consist Of A Strawman And An
Oversimplification Of The Relevant Standard
The State's arguments on the first prong of the Perry test are unpersuasive because they

ignore the central point - that, when the prosecutor refers to facts not in evidence or
misrepresents the evidence, that is misconduct that can, in and of itself, deprive the defendant of
his constitutional right to a fair trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227; State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404,
418 (Ct. App. 2013). Since it is the attempt to get a verdict based on something other than the
evidence actually presented that is the problem, it does not ultimately matter what that
unadmitted evidence might have shown, or what other arguments the prosecutor might have
made. See id.
The State's argument, however, does precisely that. (See Resp. Br., p.8 (arguing there
was no misconduct because the prosecutor could have argued, or was also arguing, that none of
the witnesses who actually testified had corroborated Mr. Saenz's alternate-perpetrator theory).)
This is a strawman argument because, regardless of the other, ostensibly-proper arguments the
prosecutor made or could have made, he still actually violated Mr. Saenz's constitutional rights
by including an argument that there were other people who did not testify at the trial, but who
also did not corroborate Mr. Saenz's alternate-perpetrator theory, and asking the jury to take that
fact into consideration.

As such, this Court should reject the State's irrelevant strawman

argument.

1

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
3

Besides, the State's assertion - that it was not clear the prosecutor was actually inviting
the jurors to decide the case based on his pretrial assessment of the evidence, as opposed to
suggesting "that had there been such a witness the defense would have called him or her" (Resp.
Br., p.9) - is disingenuous at best. The prosecutor's argument below was specifically that there
were no favorable witnesses Mr. Saenz could have called. (Tr., p.612, Ls.9-17.) Therefore, it is
improper for the State to switch positions and now suggest that what the prosecutor was actually
trying to argue was Mr. Saenz failed to call a hypothetical logical witness in his defense.
Compare State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 627-28 (Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that the

prosecutor can comment on a defendant's failure to call a logical witness whose existence and
pontifical testimony was clear from the facts presented at trial, though recognizing even that
could, potentially, impermissibly shift the burden of proof); see also, e.g., State v. Cohagan, 162
Idaho 717, 721 (2017) (reiterating that it is improper for the State to try to change positions on
appeal).
The State's argument in this regard is also disingenuous because, despite demanding the
prosecutor's argument be read in context (Resp. Br., p.9), the State's argument on appeal ignores
what the context actually shows. The entirety of the prosecutor's rebuttal arguments, and thus,
the full context, reads:
I was sitting in my office, and I had listened to hours of interviews. I had
tried to describe the details of what people said. I read all the police reports and
watched all the videos. And I was sitting there with all of these facts bouncing
around in my head. And the thought occurred to me: Is there one person, one
person who says the defendant wasn't there? The defendant didn't do this. Or it
was somebody else. Not one.
And so, I listen to the defense go through some of those same facts, I
come back with the very same thing. Not one person says the defendant didn't do
this. Or he wasn't there. Or identifies somebody else as doing this. Just him.
The person who admits to [Mr. Reyes] that he was pissed about the way he was
treated. And the person who slips up and admits there was a second encounter
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when I was leaving and [Mr. Wise] came at me. The person with the beer glasses.
Not that he came with someone else. Not that he came with [Mr. Reyes]. He
came at me. And when you have that, you have one person. And I'm asking you
to find him guilty.
(Tr., p.612, Ls.9-17.)

This is a textbook example of prosecutorial misconduct because the

argument implies what the other, unpresented evidence (the hours of interviews, all the police
reports, and all the videos) would have been (that "not one" of the people interviewed in this case
said Mr. Saenz was not the assailant) and asserts the jurors should convict Mr. Saenz based, at
least in part, on that fact ("Not one person says the defendant didn't do this," and he "admitted"
the bartender came at him, "[a]nd when you have that, you have one person. And I'm asking
you to find him guilty."). Therefore, regardless of what else the prosecutor was, or could have
been, arguing, what he actually argued was improper and violated Mr. Saenz's unwaived
constitutional rights.
The State's insistence that the prosecutor's rebuttal argument needs to be read in context
is also hypocritical because its argument on the other aspect of the prosecutor's misconduct - the
misrepresentation of the facts in the record - is based on considering the "he came at me"
statement out of its context. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) To that point, the State's assertion- that
the prosecutor may argue inferences from the evidence (Resp. Br., p.11) - overly simplifies the
applicable standard.

The actual standard does not allow the prosecutor to argue just any

inference; rather, the actual standard allows a prosecutor to argue reasonable inferences to the
jury. See State v. Lanlford, 1623 Idaho 4 77, 497 (2017) ("[P]rosecutors may argue reasonable
inferences based on the evidence, including that one of the two sides is lying.") (emphasis
added); see also State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, _ , 443 P.3d 129, 137 (2019) (finding no
misconduct because "the prosecutor's statement was a reasonable inference from the evidence"),
reh 'g denied (emphasis added).

5

The importance of that distinction was demonstrated in the Court of Appeals' decision in
State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570 (Ct. App. 2007), which the State does not so much as mention in

its response. (See generally Resp. Br.) In Beebe, held the prosecutor committed misconduct by
taking a statement by the defendant out of context and arguing it was a confession to the disputed
element of the case. Id. While it may have been possible to read that statement in a vacuum as a
confession, it was not reasonable to draw that inference in light of the context in which that
statement was made. See id. Therefore, arguing that inference to the jury was misconduct. Id.
The same is true of the prosecutor's argument in this case. While the statement "he came
at me" could potentially, by itself in a vacuum, imply a confession, the context in which
Mr. Saenz made that statement shows that is not a reasonable inference to draw in this case.
That is because that statement was in the context of Mr. Saenz attempting to describe events of
which he had a hazy recollection: "He came at me -- I don't know if he came at me. I don't
know, I don't remember his aggression or anything. But, um, you know, I don't know, like I
said, I don't remember hitting him."

(Exhibit 28, ~0:50.) Therefore, it was not reasonable to

parse this statement of a lacking memory so that it looks like a knowing confession. Compare
Beebe, 145 Idaho at 574-75.

As such, arguing that inference constituted prosecutorial

misconduct because it misrepresented that piece of evidence to the jury. Id.
Thus, when the prosecutor's actual arguments and the relevant evidence are viewed in
context, it is clear that the prosecutor was asking the jurors to decide the case based on facts
which were not presented into evidence and based on a misrepresentation of the evidence. In
doing so, the prosecutor violated Mr. Saenz's constitutional right to a fair trial. See Perry, 150
Idaho 227; Branigh, 155 Idaho at 418. Thus, this error satisfies the first prong of the Perry test.
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B.

The State's Strawman Argument Is No More Persuasive On The Second Prong Of The
Perry Analysis Than It Was On The First Prong
The State used its strawman argument from the first prong in its analysis on the second

prong of the fundamental error analysis as well.

(Resp. Br., p.9 (arguing that, since the

prosecutor could have also argued that the witnesses who testified did not corroborate
Mr. Saenz's theory, there was no value to objecting to the prosecutor's reference to other,
unadmitted evidence on that same point, and so, the failure to object must have been strategic).)
As before, that argument should be rejected because it does not change the fact that the
prosecutor had actually also argued facts outside the record. Cf State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26,
32 (2017) (reiterating the principle that the courts evaluate what the officers actually did, not
what they might have otherwise done had they not violated the Constitution).
In fact, it is for that reason that the State's argument on the second prong fails under
Miller. The Miller Court explained that the focus of the second prong is on what the record

actually shows in regard to whether trial counsel was actually making a strategic decision. See
Miller, 443 P.3d at 133. Accordingly, Miller rejected the argument - that, because there was no

perceived reason to not object, the failure to object could not have been strategic - as it did not
address what the record actually showed. Id. The State's argument in this case is essentially the
same as that rejected argument - that because there was no perceived point to objecting, the
failure to object must have been strategic - and should be rejected for the same reasons.
Applying Miller's analysis, the record in this case actually shows trial counsel was not
exercising a strategic decision to not object to the prosecutor's rebuttal statements. (See App.
Br., p.11 (distinguishing this case from Perry andAdams 2 on this point); see generally Resp. Br.

2

State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009).
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(not responding to that analysis).) In Perry, for example, there were multiple instances of the
prosecutor attempting to vouch for a witness's credibility, and defense counsel objected only
when that misconduct occurred during examination of one of the witnesses. Perry, 150 Idaho at
230. Therefore, the Supreme Court held the record showed a reasonable possibility that trial
counsel had exercised a strategic decision to not object again (and potentially draw further
attention to the vouching) when the prosecutor vouched for the witness's credibility in closing
argument. Id. Here, however, that possibility does not exist because the misconduct occurred
only once, in the last statement to the jurors before deliberations began. (See generally Tr.)
Therefore, unlike Perry, the record in this case does not show that reasonable possibility of a
strategic decision to not object. In other words, the record here, unlike the record in Perry,
shows the failure to object in this case was not strategic
That conclusion is reinforced by Adams. In that case, the record showed defense counsel
actually chose to use an alternative strategy- to rehabilitate a potentially-biased juror as opposed
to seeking to remove that potential juror from the panel. Adams, 147 Idaho at 860-62. As such,
the record clearly showed the failure to object was strategic. Id.; see also Miller, 443 P.3d at
139-40 (explaining the appellant had failed to show there was no tactical decision in that case
because, rather than objecting to misconduct in the prosecutor's initial closing argument,
"Miller's counsel rebutted the prosecutor's statement in his closing argument" instead).

In

Mr. Saenz's case, however, the record shows that trial counsel did not actually deploy any
alternative strategy. (See generally Tr.) That is unsurprising, since the misconduct occurred in
the last permitted statement to the jurors, and as such, there was no opportunity at which trial
counsel could have deployed an alternative strategy. That, then, reinforces the conclusion that
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this record shows trial counsel was not pursuing some alternative strategy, and therefore, that the
failure to object was not tactical.
Rather, this case is like Branigh, which the State also completely ignored. (See generally
Resp. Br.) In Branigh, the prosecutor referred to facts not in evidence in both his initial and
rebuttal closing arguments. Branigh, 155 Idaho at 417-18 (not recounting defense counsel's
intervening arguments). The Court of Appeals recognized Perry's requirement that the record
clearly show "whether the failure to object was a tactical decision," and held that the defendant
had carried his burden in that regard. Id. at 418 ("Branigh has also shown that the error plainly
exists."). The record here shows much the same thing as the record in Branigh showed, and so,
is similarly clear on the second prong of Perry.

C.

The State's Conclusory Argument On The Third Prong Of Perry Runs Contrary To The
Relevant Law
This Court should reject the State's argument on the third prong of Perry because its

argument (Resp. Br., p.10) consists of one conclusory assertion without citation to any legal
authority.

See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) (explaining a party waives their

argument on an issue if they fail to present either analysis or authority).
The State's unsupported assertion is particularly problematic because it actually runs
contrary to the relevant authority. Specifically, the State contended there can be no prejudice in
this case because "nothing in this record would suggest that the jury considered" the improper
facts to which the prosecutor drew their attention. (Resp. Br., p.10.) Requiring the appellant to
present evidence of what the jurors actually considered cannot be the standard under Perry and
Miller because the law is clear that such evidence of "how those jurors viewed and interpreted
the testimony . . . relates to the jurors' deliberative process which is specifically prohibited by
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[I.R.E.] 606(b)."3 Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 496 (1999); accord Payne v. State, 159 Idaho
879, _ , 367 P.3d 274, 280 (Ct. App. 2016); Reyonlds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 26 (Ct. App.
1994). "Because jurors cannot be questioned as to whether they were in fact prejudiced by
extraneous information," the evaluation of prejudice properly focuses on "whether the
information reasonably could have produced prejudice, when evaluated in light of all the events
and the evidence at trial." Id. (internal quotation omitted); accord Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391,
403 ( 1991) (explaining that, to say that an error did not affect the verdict is to say "that error
[was] unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the question as revealed
by the record"), overruled on other grounds.
This rule is actually evident in Miller and Perry, as both require that the defendant needs
to show that the error "affected" the outcome. Miller, 443 P .3d at 134; Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
In this context, "affect" means "to produce an effect on: INFLUENCE," and "influence" means
"2. to have an effect on the condition or development." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND
THESAURUS, 15, 423 (2007). Thus, the focus of the third prong of Perry is on whether the error
had an effect on the way the outcome was reached (the way the deliberations developed). See
Miller, 443 P.3d at 134; Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. The only way to analyze that question in light

of I.R.E. 606(b) is to evaluate the importance of the error within the context of all the other
evidence presented. See Roberts, 132 Idaho at 496.

3

I.R.E. 606(b) might allow the admission of evidence to establish that improper information had,
as a matter of fact, come to the juror's attention, but that is not what the State was arguing here.
(See Resp. Br., p.10.) Moreover, the transcript of the prosecutor's argument in this case already
established that fact. As such, the State's prejudice argument on appeal is still improper.
Compare Reyonlds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 26 (Ct. App. 1994) ("Reynolds sought to introduce the
[juror's] testimony not to show what prejudicial evidence came in, which would have been a
matter of record, but to show how that evidence affected the final verdict. We agree with the
district court that this is exactly the type of evidence Rule 606(b) meant to exclude.")
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In fact, that is exactly how the Court of Appeals has evaluated this question.

For

example, in Branigh, it held the prosecutor’s improper reference to facts outside the record was
harmless under prong three of Perry because those unadmitted facts only spoke to a tangential
issue and the evidence speaking to the central consideration was strong. Branigh, 155 Idaho at
417-20; see also State v. Nichols, 156 Idaho 365, 376-77 (explaining an error was not prejudicial
under Perry because the point to which the error spoke was not actually put at issue by the
defense). The error in that case was, in other words, not important within the overall context of
that case.
The Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion in State v. Sutton, in which the
defendant argued that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the charge of intimidating a
witness was prejudicial under Perry because the victim-witness’s credibility was in question,
because the jury failed to acquit on other charges, and because there was evidence about the
timing of the relevant events contradicted the State’s theory. State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 167
(Ct. App. 2011). The Court of Appeals agreed, explaining that, had the jury been properly
instructed, it could have believed the defense theory and ruled in his favor. See id. at 168-69.
Essentially, because that error was important within the overall context of that case, the
defendant “met his burden of demonstrating the error was not harmless.” Id.
Mr. Saenz’s case is more like Sutton than Branigh. The prosecutor’s misconduct spoke
directly to the primary issue in this case, as he was trying to specifically rebut Mr. Saenz’s
argument on the only point which had been contested. Also, as in Sutton, the evidence the State
actually presented on the central question was susceptible to numerous reasonable doubts. (See
App. Br., pp.12-14 (detailing all the points at which the evidence below was susceptible to
reasonable doubts); see generally Resp. Br. (not challenging Mr. Saenz’s analysis in that

11

regard).)

In fact, the record indicates the jurors actually harbored such doubts, as their

deliberations in this case lasted for three hours into the evening. (See R., p.102 (showing the
deliberations began at 4:31 p.m. and ended at 7:28 p.m.)
Therefore, because the information to which the prosecutor had improperly drawn the
jurors' attention was central to the questions at issue in this case and because the evidence the
State actually presented was relatively weak, the prosecutorial misconduct was important within
the context of this case.

Therefore, under the proper analysis of the third prong of Perry,

Mr. Saenz has, like the appellant in Sutton, met his burden to show the error affected the
outcome in his case.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Saenz respectfully requests this Court vacate the verdict and judgment of conviction
in this case and remand it for a fair trial.
DATED this 28 th day of August, 2019.

/ s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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